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Gary S. Fields 
Trade Strategies 
and the Poor: 
Adjusting to New Realities 
Introduction 
The theme of this seminar is policy reform and equity. Because 
neither term has an unambiguous meaning, it is worth saying a few 
words about how policy reform and equity shall be used. 
I start with "equity" and offer two examples to help illustrate two 
different notions. 
Example 1: In the great majority of successfully growing coun-
tries, the real incomes of all income groups increase. In quite a 
number of these countries, real income has grown by a larger 
percentage in the top deciles than in the bottom deciles. Yet, in 
real terms, the poor are less poor than before. Has growth been 
equitable? 
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Example 2: In some countries, real national income has fallen 
substantially. In some of these "development disasters," the rich 
have exported their financial capital and the skilled professionals 
and merchants have left, either by choice or by compulsion. 
Those who remain are poorer than before, and more uniformly 
so. How does equity in the new situation compare with that in the 
old? 
If there is uncertainty about how to answer these questions, it is 
because the concept of equity is imprecisely defined. Users of the 
term "equity" typically have either (or both) of two concepts in 
mind. 
One notion of equity is a relative one. Viewed this way, equity is 
a matter of the relative income positions of different groups. The 
further apart are their incomes, the more unequal the situation (or 
in some parlance, the "more inequitable" it is). From this point of 
view, "equity" arises when incomes are brought closer together. By 
this relative conception, conditions have gotten less equitable in 
Example One and more equitable in Example Two. 
The other notion of equity is an absolute one. By that conception, 
growth is equitable if the poor are helped absolutely and inequitable 
if they are not. By the absolute conception, Example One describes 
an equitable change and Example Two an inequitable change. 
I personally favor an absolute approach to assessing who benefits 
from economic activity. This is because alleviation of poverty is what 
I think most development policies, and hence most policy reforms, 
are all about. To this way of thinking, what is of primary importance 
is whether the poor get richer in real terms; a secondary consideration 
is whether the rich get richer faster than the poor do. But I must stress 
that this is a value judgment with which some agree and others 
disagree. This paper will focus on improvements in absolute in-
comes, and make only passing reference to changes in income 
inequality.1 
The other term requiring clarification is "policy reform." Ordi-
narily, when one speaks about a reform, one speaks about something 
which starts out faulty and is then fixed. But to speak in such terms 
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requires that both the speaker and the listener have a clear under-
standing of when something is flawed and when it is improved. When 
it comes to replacing a damaged system with a properly functioning 
one, or a corrupt system by an honest one, few disagreements would 
be expected. But when we take up the matter of economic policy, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to be unambiguous about such judg-
ments. "Reforming the tariff structure" means one thing to a 
protectionist seeking relief from import competition and quite 
another to a free trader; however, "lowering tarifFs" means the same 
thing to both, even if they disagree about the desirability of lower 
tarifFs. To avoid confusion, I shall speak in terms of "strategies" and 
"policy changes," rather than "reforms," in what follows. 
The major policy issue examined in this paper is that of a country's 
choice of a trade strategy in the context of helping the poor. As the 
end of the 1980s approaches, developing countries face a much more 
difficult economic situation than that which they confronted at the 
end of the 1970s. The paper begins by reviewing these new realities 
and the need for adjusting to them. After mentioning some non-
policies, I proceed to consider both successful and unsuccessful 
country experiences and draw lessons from them. One policy singled 
out for special attention is wage policy and its interaction with trade 
strategy. I then analyze the package of policies for outward-oriented, 
labor-intensive, broad-based growth in one country (Costa Rica) 
and the possibilities for policy redirection in others. The major 
findings appear in the conclusion. 
What N e w Realities? 
As developing economies plan their policies in the late 1980s, they 
must face four new realities on the international scene: a secular 
worsening of the terms of trade, the inability of some and the 
diminished ability of others to accumulate additional debt to finance 
growth, the reduced likelihood of sustaining previous standards of 
living without further adjustments, and prospects of continued 
sluggishness in the international economy. 
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Worsening Terms of Trade. Figures 1 and 2 depict the time 
paths of prices for nonoil commodities and for oil, respectively. In 
real terms, nonoil commodity prices have fallen by nearly one-third 
between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s. The secular downturn 
was interrupted only in the mid-1970s. Meanwhile, the real price of 
oil more than doubled since 1973. Because most developing coun-
tries export manufactured and primary products and import oil, 
these figures imply that the terms of trade have shifted against the 
developing countries. Other things being equal, the developing 
countries are poorer than before. This impoverishment would be 
expected to be felt among all socioeconomic groups. In particular, 
workers will be poorer to the extent that their marginal products are 
lower and/or their labor less in demand. 
Difficulties in Sustaining Debt-Financed Growth. In the 
1960s and early 1970s, the developing countries of the world bor-
rowed at modest rates to sustain their economic development. But 
1973 proved to be a watershed. In that year, the first oil price shock 
was felt. The oil-importing developing countries of Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia sought to reinvigorate their economies by borrow-
ing from abroad. At the same time, the oil-exporting countries 
suddenly found themselves with unprecedented levels of earnings 
and the consequent need to invest them where they could accumu-
late rapidly. Petrodollars were loaned to developing countries via 
banks in the major industrialized countries, often at low or even 
negative real rates of interest. Governments in less developed coun-
tries (LDCs) found the temptation to borrow irresistible. Debt 
accumulated. By 1979, LDC debts to commercial banks had reached 
$160 billion. 
With the second oil price shock (1979), the oil-importing devel-
oping countries faced a yet higher import bill, coupled with a 
worldwide recession which limited their ability to export. Rather 
than adjusting their policies at that time, most continued to borrow 
as long as they could. Real interest rates jumped, as did debt-service 
ratios. By 1982, for all LDCs taken together, the ratio of debt to 
exports had reached 131 percent and debt-service ratios had reached 
19 percent of exports. By 1984, the overall debt for Latin America 
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Figure 1 
Nonoil Commodity Prices in Nominal Terms and in Real Terms 
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had increased to U.S. $360 billion, up from U.S. $41 billion dollars 
just eleven years earlier (Tokman and Wurgaft, 1987, p. 40). One 
country after another drew down its foreign exchange reserves in an 
attempt to avoid economic contraction, though not in Mexico or in 
many of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Asia. 
As net reserves eroded to the point of elimination, and as it 
became clear that many developing countries could not repay loan 
principal or, in some cases, interest, loans suddenly dried up. Most 
developing countries could no longer postpone adjustment by 
borrowing unconditionally from abroad. More than forty develop-
ing countries have postponed debt payments. Peru has announced 
that it will limit its debt service to 10 percent of exports. Brazil has 
halted payments altogether. Net capital inflow into the developing 
countries has virtually dried up. For most developing countries, 
debt-financed growth is over. 
Reduced Likelihood of Sustaining Previous Standards of 
Living Without Adjustment. Because of the rise of import prices, 
the fall of export prices, the rise in real interest rates, and global 
recession, the developing countries of the world were genuinely 
poorer. Had they been willing to accept this, they might have scaled 
down some of their plans and kept their economies growing at a 
slower but nonetheless positive rate. But for the most part, they did 
not. Instead, they attempted to postpone the day of reckoning. (See, 
for instance, Inter-American Development Bank, 1985; World 
Bank, 1986; and Geller and Tokman, 1987.) However, when their 
foreign reserves disappeared and foreign loans dried up, one devel-
oping country after another had no choice but to undergo a 
wrenching process of contraction and adjustment. 
The macroeconomic declines were severe. In Latin America and 
the Caribbean as a whole, per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
fell by 11 percent between 1981 and 1983. When output is adjusted 
for changes in the terms of trade and for net factor payments abroad, 
income per capita fell even more sharply (World Bank, 1986, p. 4). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, per capita GDP, which had grown at just 1.3 
percent per annum in the 1960s and 0.7 percent per annum in the 
197.0s, declined by 11 percent between 1981 and 1983 (Aboagye 
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and Gozo, 1987, p. 78). In Asia, however, the situation was more 
favorable: real GDP continued to grow, albeit at slower rates than 
before (Lee, 1987, p. 100). 
According to experts on the various regions, the equity effects 
were equally severe, though hard data are difficult to come by in 
many countries. Overall, living conditions in many places have 
gotten markedly worse (Addison and Demery, 1985; UNICEF, 
1987). 
In Latin America, open urban unemployment rates increased by 
more than 50 percent (Tokman and Wurgaft, 1987, p. 62) and real 
wages fell by as much as 40 percent (World Bank, 1986, pp. 15-18; 
Tokman and Wurgaft, 1987, p. 70). The share of the the informal 
sector in total employment increased from 29 percent to 32 percent. 
(Tokman, 1986, p. 535). Government budgets have been sharply 
cut and so too have social services (World Bank, 1986; ECLAC, 
1986). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, Aboagye and Gozo (1987) and Addison 
and Demery (1985) give examples of groups whose employment 
and/or real wages have fallen; but in the absence of comprehensive 
household surveys, they do not know (nor do we) how representative 
these experiences are. 
In Asia, "Our main concern in analysing the effect of the recession 
has been to gauge the extent to which it has aggravated poverty in 
developing countries. While absence of data has prevented any 
quantitative estimates from being made, it is nonetheless clear that 
the recession has had adverse effects on the poor in developing 
countries" (Lee, 1987,p. 130). A similar conclusion is reached by the 
International Labor Organization's Asian Regional Team for Em-
ployment Promotion (Edgren and Muqtada, 1986). 
The effect of adjustment per se on these declining macroeconomic 
and microeconomic conditions is very difficult to assess. Logically, 
one has to compare what did happen under the existing set of policies 
with what would have happened under alternative policies. Such 
analyses do not yet exist. Also, we must be careful when we look at 
who loses, that we also take fair account of who gains.2 
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Empirical evidence is of some help. Krueger (1984) has recognized 
the equity aspects head-on, writing (p. 422): 
The major problem with liberalization, as with so many other 
economic policy problems, is that politicians, government officials, 
and the informed public can readily foresee those interests that are 
likely to be damaged in the short run by any liberalization effort; they 
cannot as readily see the economic activities that were harmed, and 
hence did not prosper, because of regulations. Moreover, even some 
who would in the long run benefit by liberalization (as for example 
the Korean businessmen who became exporters in the 1960s but 
were entrepreneurs in import-substitution industries in the 1950s) 
perceive the short-run harm that it would cause their interests and fail 
to recognize the new opportunuities that would arise in the longer 
run. 
A World Bank study of trade liberalization by Papageorgiou, 
Michaely, and Choksi (1986) presents "preliminary evidence" re-
vealing no obvious relationship between unemployment and liberali-
zation in either direction. In general, trade liberalization is not found 
to cause unemployment nor does unemployment influence the 
efficacy of liberalization. They also report themselves unable, be-
cause of data limitations, to assess the poverty and inequality conse-
quences of liberalization.3 The World DevelopmentReport1987'gives 
no further information on this. However, Sachs (1987, p. 40) takes 
the international agencies to task, urging that the standards of living 
of the poor be maintained through tax increases: 
The World Bank and IMF should realize that increases in taxes, 
especially on upper incomes and property, rather than cuts in public 
expenditures, can often bring about more equitable adjustments to 
the current crisis and perhaps increase the chances of success for 
stabilization programs...There is simply no evidence for the propo-
sition that spending cuts, rather than tax increases, are to be vastly 
preferred on efficiency grounds as the method of adjustment. 
A debate on such issues is raging among the international 
agencies, with the World Bank and the IMF taking one side and the 
ILO and UNICEF taking the other. A synthesis of positions has not 
yet emerged; possibly, one never will. 
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Sluggish International Economy in the 1980s. The world 
economy has grown slowly in the 1980s. Real GDP in industrial 
market economies grew at an average annual rate of 4.7 percent 
between 1965 and 1973, slowed to 2.8 percent between 1973 and 
1980, and slowed again to 2.2 percent per year between 1981 and 
1985. For developing countries, the corresponding percentages are 
6.6 percent, 5.4 percent, and 3.5 percent (World Development Report 
1986, p. 24). Summing up the situation from the perspective of 
workers in developing countries, van der Hoeven and Richards 
(1987, p. 135) conclude: 
It was not only the external shocks that caused the crisis but also the 
nature of the adjustment policies which all countries in the North and 
the South applied . . . [T]wo facts may be worth identifying. One is 
the almost unanimous switch in the early 1980s to restrictive policies 
which resulted in slow economic growth and a massive increase in 
unemployment. The second is the absence of efforts within the 
OECD countries to arrive at concerted economic stimulation. 
The economic outlook is for continued slow growth.4 Develop-
ing countries must plan accordingly. 
Adjusting Trade Strategies to the N e w Realities 
Economics is concerned with constrained choices. When the con-
straints change, so too must the choices. 
The new realities of the international economy imply that many 
developing countries face a new, more tightly binding set of con-
straints. The appropriate response is not to attempt to keep on the 
same course at all costs. Nor is it to give up in the mistaken belief that 
nothing can be done in today's environment. Rather, the appropriate 
response is to assess the constraints, take stock of the options, make 
the best choices, and design policies accordingly. 
Nonpolicies. Nonpolicies are embodied in wishes or conditions 
which developing countries earnesdy desire but cannot obtain, 
strident voices notwithstanding. It is a nonpolicy to wish that the 
terms of trade could be shifted in favor of the primary products 
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produced by the developing countries. It is a nonpolicy to hope that 
energy prices will stay low or fall further. It is a nonpolicy to wish that 
multinational corporations were more socially oriented. And it is a 
nonpolicy to wish that the industrialized countries would offer larger 
fractions of their national products in aid to the poorer countries of 
the world. 
What these nonpolicies have in common is that the wishes are not 
matched by any corresponding policy instruments. There is nothing 
developing countries can do to make these things happen. So 
although the first-best outcome from the point of view of those 
countries would be for some of these things to take place, exhorta-
tions are no substitute for action. It is with actions, not ideals, that 
the policy alternatives analyzed below are concerned. 
External Resources. Two simple facts prevail: (a) most develop-
ing countries cannot accumulate additional debt, and (b) either they 
must service the existing debt or not service it at their peril. 
The most straightforward response would be to accept these facts 
and to adjust to them. If such a decision were to be made, the country 
would have to rely on the resources it could generate to service the 
debt, meet pressing current needs, and use whatever is left for 
economic expansion. 
The straightforward response is also the most difficult. The reason 
is that for many countries, if they were to proceed in this fashion, they 
would never get through the stage of meeting pressing current 
needs. Indeed, many of these would be unmet. The social effects 
especially on the poor, would in many cases be devastating. Knowing 
this, the countries involved have responded in two ways: they seek 
external support in other ways such as structural adjustment loans 
and economic support funds, and they try new methods of dealing 
with their debt. 
At the moment it appears that the external assistance and new 
approaches to debt are bringing some relief to a number of develop-
ing countries. At the very least, they are able to forestall some of the 
ravages of sharp cuts which would otherwise be required in the 
absence of these measures. Without the infusion of external re-
sources, the equity situation would probably be even worse. 
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Trade. Trade offers the only practicable way out of the dilemma 
developing countries are facing. The more they can earn from what 
they export or from what domestic suppliers produce efficiendy to 
substitute for imports, the less they will have to cut expenditures to 
remain within their budget constraints. Standards of living can be 
higher as a result. 
What can developing countries do? The answer, very simply, is 
that they should do what is efficient in today's circumstances. But 
"efficient" does not necessarily mean GNP maximization. Rather, 
efficiency should be denned in terms of overall development goals. 
One such goal is poverty alleviation. As we know from various 
studies, labor incomes (including the income from small-scale farm-
ing and self-employment) are primarily responsible for variations in 
standards of living (Fields, 1980). The question, then, is how to shift 
the demand for labor to add to national production, create jobs and 
raise real wages, and thereby lessen poverty. Increased production for 
the world economy offers such a possibility. 
The call for increased trade as a vehicle for adjusting to the new 
realities may seem strange to some. It is said that with a sluggish 
world economy and with world demand barely increasing, the 
developing countries can hardly expect to find new markets or 
expand sales. The counterargument is that those countries which are 
doing very well in today's environment — Japan and Korea, for 
example — are doing so precisely through export expansion. If world 
markets are not closed to exports from those countries, why should 
they be any more closed to the products of Jamaica, Peru, or the 
Philippines? The answer, I contend, is that they are not. The 
arguments for alleviating poverty by choice of an outward-looking 
trade strategy occupy much of the balance of this paper. 
Benefits o f Export-led Growth: The Asian Experience 
As is well known, many Asian countries—among them, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan—have pursued economic 
growth by expanding exports. They pursued export-led growth, 
because that is what comparative advantage dictated. Of course, 
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these economies grew very rapidly: average real economic growth 
was at least 7 percent per capita in each of the five economies for more 
than two decades. In the 1970s, when these economies had fully 
embarked on outward-looking economic growth strategies, exports 
grew at annual rates ranging from 5 percent in Hong Kong to 29 
percent in Korea. 
The East Asian economies adjusted to external events such as oil 
price shocks much better than did the economies of Latin America; 
see Balassa (1984), Hasan (1984), and Sachs (1985) for a compari-
son of the adjustment experiences of the different regions. One 
reason for this successful response was that the East Asian NICs did 
not stick with the same strategies. Rather, they changed what they 
did in response to changing comparative advantage, both by using 
different production methods (in particular, capital-deepening) and 
by switching to different products (e.g., allowing their textile indus-
tries to decline, thereby freeing up labor for use in other sectors).5 
Export Substitution and Export Promotion. Many outsiders 
believe, mistakenly, that the newly industrializing countries of East 
Asia followed essentially the same policies. In reality, they sought to 
expand exports in quite different ways (see Galenson, 1985, particu-
larly the paper by Krause; and Lau, 1986, particularly the paper by 
Scitovsky, for overviews of some of these differences). In Ranis' 
terminology (1981), Korea adopted a policy of "export promotion" 
while Taiwan chose a policy of "export substitution." Because this 
distinction in terminology is not widely familiar, and because the 
term "export promotion" is not used consistently in the literature, I 
shall elaborate upon the differences between "export promotion" 
and "export substitution." 
"Export substitution" means that the country in question is 
trying to substitute production for the world market in place of 
production for the domestic market, the former being more profit-
able for firms and/or more remunerative for workers than the latter. 
Its essential elements are (1) relying heavily on the private sector so 
that individual firms and entrepreneurs provide the driving creative 
force for economic growth; (2) eliminating price distortions (" getting 
the prices right"), so that (a) market prices of products reflect social 
Trade Strategies and the Poor 127 
profitability and (b) inputs in the productive process are valued in 
accordance with true economic scarcity; (3) producing according to 
comparative advantage, which typically means the manufacture of 
labor-intensive products; and (4) exporting to the world market, 
which will happen in a free and open market if and only if companies 
are able to compete on the basis of quality and cost. 
"Export promotion," as I shall use the term here, means that the 
country seeks to increase exports by actively stimulating particular 
sectors through direct action (e.g., building an export processing 
zone) and/or targeted fiscal policy (e.g., tax credits, protection 
against foreign competition). Some elements of export promotion 
are similar to those of export substitution: reliance on the private 
sector, price incentives, comparative advantage, and production for 
export. However, export promotion does not leave resource alloca-
tion decisions to the private sector alone. Rather, the defining 
characteristic of export promotion is the active targeting of export 
activities. One way of doing this is by direct government interven-
tion, for instance, by an industrial policy of "picking winners." 
Another mechanism of export promotion is to tamper with market 
prices, for instance, through protective tariffs, input subsidies, credit 
rationing, or tax breaks for certain export activities. 
Among the developing economies of Asia, Hong Kong is the one 
whose policies are closest to the export substitution regime. Taiwan 
is also largely of that type. By contrast, Japan, Singapore, and Korea 
engaged more in export promotion. 
Trade Strategy. Despite their differences, what the economies of 
East Asia have in common is a trade strategy oriented toward the 
world market. One shared attribute of their successes with export-led 
growth is the unremitting drive of firms in those economies to 
penetrate foreign markets and earn profits thereby. Throughout 
those economies, the world market is viewed as an opportunity for 
profitable sales and not as a hostile force keeping those countries in 
perpetual dependency. Public policy is committed to export-oriented 
growth. Those countries welcome foreign companies and foreign 
capital as partners in the development process, seeking especially to 
benefit from foreigners' technologies, expertise, and managerial 
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skills. The business environment is conducive to entrepreneurial 
activity; profit is not a dirty word. And political stability, though 
maintained at considerable social cost, nonetheless has the favorable 
economic consequence that both domestic and foreign firms know 
the rules of the game. 
Some other aspects of the East Asian successes bear mention. 
They believed that if they produced good products at low prices, that 
foreign markets would be open to them, as indeed they turned out 
to be. The products they exported were those which had a pre-
existing demand. One has to think very hard to come up with a single 
good created by the East Asian NICs which had not existed before. 
Also, market prices reflected comparative advantage. Wages have not 
been artificially high nor capital artificially cheap. Finally, openness 
stimulated competition and hence efficiency. In the words of Anne 
Krueger (1985, p. 23): 
The fact of openness itself, rather than of export growth, is a critical 
ingredient for rapid increases in output and productivity. This 
consideration is significant in evaluating the prospects for future 
growth of developing countries in the context of a potentially slower 
expansion of world trade: if it is openness itself that conveys benefits 
due to competition and the nature of policy instruments employed, 
the gains from export orientation will be almost as great (provided 
the world economy remains open) with slower growth of world trade 
as with more rapid growth. 
The East Asian NICs were not always outward-looking. Both 
Taiwan and Korea were much more inward-looking in the 1950s. 
But they liberalized their policies in the 1960s. In Taiwan, the two 
key elements of the policy reform were (1) recognizing the potential 
for exploiting opportunities afforded by international trade and 
investment rather than continuing to operate behind protectionist 
barriers, and (2) setting realistic, positive real interest rates (Tsiang, 
1984). These changes were occasioned by the relatively small size of 
the domestic market, the continued pressure of surplus labor, and the 
drying-up of the "easy" phases of import substitution (Ranis, 1979). 
The result in Taiwan was rapid export-led economic growth, virtually 
uninterrupted for a quarter century (Kuo, 1982). In Korea, the story 
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was largely the same in essential respects (Frank, Kim, and Westphal, 
1975; Hong, 1981; Balassa, 1985; Scitovsky, 1986). 
Benefits of Trade. Judging by the record in the newly industri-
alizing countries of East Asia, seizing the opportunity presented by 
the world market has had a very high payoff indeed in terms of 
equitable growth. As shown in research studies by myself (Fields, 
1980, 1984) and others (e.g., Turnham, 1970; Squire, 1981; 
Krueger, 1981), both export substitution and export promotion can 
extend the benefits of growth to the masses by improving job 
opportunities and consequently raising living standards. Hong (1987, 
pp. 292-3) puts it this way: 
In Korea, the efficiency gains associated with the long process of the 
opening up of a semiautarkic economy to semifree trade have 
materialized not only in the form of rapidly rising real wage rates but 
also in the form of high rates of return on investment. These 
enhanced rates of return in turn seem to have kindled the 'animal 
spirit' of Korean entrepreneurs and generated a vigorous pace of 
investment activities in Korea during the past twenty-year period. 
Contrariwise, the employment and income distribution experi-
ences under import-substitution industrialization have generally 
been less favorable and the benefits of growth less widespread 
(Prebisch, 1964; Baer and Herve, 1966; Morawetz, 1974; Bruton, 
1974; Krueger, 1981 and 1986; and others). 
Data on the experiences of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan are presented in Table 1. Their improvements under export-
led growth have been sensational. Let us take Taiwan as a case in 
point. Full employment has been attained, the unemployment rate 
reaching just 1.3 percent. Much of the employment growth that took 
place was in the manufacturing sector, the key source of export-led 
growth. Among manufacturing workers in Taiwan, real wages 
increased fourfold in twenty years. The mix of jobs improved in other 
ways as well: fewer workers were unpaid family workers and more 
were paid employees. 
The attainment of full employment, the rapid growth of real 
wages, and the improved mix of jobs led to a sharp decline in the rate 
of absolute poverty, the number of poor falling by more than half in 
Table 1 
Changes in Labour Market Conditions and Income Distribution in Seven Small Open Economies 
I. u lemployment rate 
I I . Employment composition 
A. 
B. 
C 
D 
Agriculture as a % of 
total employment 
Employees as % of 
economically active 
population 
Professional & tech., 
administrative & 
managerial, clerical, 
and sales occupations 
as % of economically 
active population 
% of employed workers 
with no schooling 
Barbados 
i960: 
1965-66 
1970: 
1976: 
1980: 
1970: 
i 9 7 5 : 
n.a 
1960: 
97o: 
n.a 
[% illiterate in brackets] 
12% 
•3% 
9% 
.6% 
1 3 % 
21-3% 
9-9% 
5 - ' % 
9-=% 
Hong Kong 
1961: 1-7% 
• 9 7 i : 4 - 4 % 
•976: 4 - 3 % 
1980: 3-7% 
1961:7-4% 
1 9 7 1 : 4 0 % 
1976: 2-5% 
1980: 1-4% 
1961: 8 3 8 % 
• 9 7 i : 8 7 - 3 % 
1980: 8 9 4 % 
1961: 27-5% 
1971:26-8% 
1976:28-3% 
1980:32-5% 
1961: 20-2% 
1971: 16-2% 
• 976: 1 3 9 % 
1980: 10-4% 
Jamaica 
i960: 1 3 5 % 
1968: 1 9 4 % 
1972:23-0% 
1980: 30-0% 
•972:33-4% 
1979: 33-6% 
n.a. 
1968: 1 4 6 % 
1 9 7 8 : 2 1 9 % 
• 9 7 0 : 3 - 5 % 
•979: ' - 7 % 
Korea 
1963:8-2% 
1967:6-2% 
•97" : 4-5% 
1976: 3-9% 
• 9 8 1 : 4 - 1 % 
1963:63-2% 
1970:50-4% 
1980:34-0% 
•963: 3 " - 5 % 
• 9 7 i : 3 9 - 3 % 
1980: 47-3% 
1963: 16-9% 
1970:22-9% 
1980: 2 9 5 % 
1960:44-7% 
1970: 23-8% 
1980: 16-0% 
Singapore 
' 9 5 7 : 5 - 2 % 
• 9 6 5 : 9 - 1 % 
1969: 10-4% 
1971: 7-0% 
•977:4-8% 
1980: 3-5% 
1957: 6-9% 
•97o: 3-5% 
•979: i -5% 
•957:73-7% 
•970: 76-5% 
•979: 83-5% 
• 9 5 7 : 3 6 8 % 
1970: 39-4% 
1979:42-5% 
• 966: 54 -1% 
1972: 20-6% 
•977:35-2% 
1980:22-5% 
Taiwan 
•955--6-3% 
1963:4-3% 
1972: 1-5% 
• 9 8 1 : 1 - 3 % 
1964: 50-0% 
1970: 36-8% 
1979:21-5% 
• 956 :36-8% 
• 964: 39-2% 
1970: 50-7% 
•979: 63-7% 
1964: 2 2 4 % 
1970: 26-9% 
1979:30-0% 
1965: [26-0%] 
1970: [20-7%] 
•975: [15-9%] 
1980: [9-0%] 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
1970: 13% 
•975: '5% 
1979: 12% 
1970: 22-7% 
•977: "3 '4% 
n.a. 
1970 :22% 
•975: 18% 
1978 :20% 
1970: 19-6% 
1975: 21-9% 
1979: 9-2 
[% illiterate in brackets] 
I980: IO'4% 1980: a a - 5 % 1980: [ 9 0 % ] 
I I I . Real wages or earnings 
IV. Poverty 
Inequality, as measured 
by Gini coefficient 
among households [Gini 
coefficient among indivi-
duals in brackets] 
ndex of avg. 
real wage, 1976 
= 100: 
1976: 1000% 
1980: 1 2 5 7 % 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Index of avg. 
real manufac-
turing wage, 
1948 = 100: 
i 960 :105 
1965: 157 
1970:167 
1975:194 
1980:253 
% of households 
with annual in-
comes less than 
HK$30oo, in 
constant 1966 
H K $ : 
1966: 18% 
1971: 1 1 % 
1976 :7% 
1966: 0-487 
1971:0-411 
1976:0-435 
1981: 0-447 
Index of 
avg. wages, 
1975 = 100: 
1980: 
Men : 69 
Women: 76 
% of labour force 
with weekly in-
comes less than 
J $20, in con-
stant 1973 J S : 
1968: 70% 
1973: 72% 
1979:80% 
1968: [0-628] 
1973: [0-651] 
1980: [0-655] 
Index of real 
earnings, 1975 
= 100: 
1966: 52 
1972: 88 
1978: 154 
1980: ' 59 
% of house-
holds with in-
comes below a 
constant real 
poverty line: 
1965--4«% 
1970: 2 3 % 
1976: 15% 
1964: 0-34 
1970: 0-33 
1976:0-38 
Index of real 
income per 
worker, 1966 
= 100: 
1966: 100 
1975: 100 
Index of real 
weekly earnings, 
all industries, 
1975 = 100: 
1975:100 
1980: 120 
% of persons with 
incomes below 
SS200 per 
month in 1975 
Prices: 
1966 :37% 
' 9 7 5 : 2 9 % 
1980 :18% 
1966: [0-499] 
1975'- [0-452] 
1980: [0-455] 
Index of real 
manufacturing 
earnings, 1954 
= 100: 
1954: 100 
i960: 102 
1970: 183 
1979:400 
% of households 
with incomes 
below specified 
figure in specified 
year: NT$20,000 
I964 ; 3 5 % 
1972: 10% 
N T $40,000 
1964: 80% 
1972 :35% 
Early 1950's: 0-5 
1968-72: 0-3 
1976-78: 0 2 7 
Index of real 
weekly earnings 
of production 
workers, 1971 
= 100: 
1971: 100 
1978: 124 
Average income 
of specified group 
in constant 
1971/72 T T $ : 
poorest quartile 
1971 /72 :89% 
1975 /76 :94% 
Median: 
1971/72: 198 
1975/76: 196 
1971/72:0-539 
•975/76: 0 4 7 4 
n.a. Time series information not available. 
Sources: Fields (1981; 1982). 
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just eight years. The income inequality picture that emerges is 
excellent. Taiwan has the lowest income inequality (as measured by 
the Gini coefficient) of any country in the world! Similar patterns of 
improvements in labor market conditions and reductions in poverty 
are recorded for Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore also. However, 
unlike Taiwan, inequality in the other NICs has been at moderate but 
not low levels. 
Many observers have concluded that the policies leading the East 
Asian economies on the path toward rapid, equitable, export-led 
growth should be copied by other developing countries. This view, 
which is expounded by such leading luminaries in the trade and 
development fields as Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1978), Krueger 
(1981), Little (1981), Balassa (1982), and others, asserts that other 
countries could succeed similarly if they too were to try to produce 
for the world market. 
These export successes demonstrate a path that developing coun-
tries might pursue to their advantage: growth led by export of 
manufactures. Of course, international trade is not enough; it is a 
means to an end, not an end in itself. The essence of economic 
development is the improvement in standards of living of the people. 
While it may be that standards of living are affected significantly by 
such publicly provided goods and services as public works, govern-
ment housing, educational systems, public health facilities, and the 
like, it is nonetheless true that the basic determinant of a person's 
economic well-being is the amount of earnings obtained from his or 
her labor. Very simply, most families derive the majority, if not all, of 
their incomes from the work they do. If they benefit from economic 
growth, it is because more job opportunities are created and/or 
wages increase in existing jobs. 
Do such export expansion activities as manufacturing Hyundais 
in Korea or sports equipment in Taiwan bring about more jobs and 
higher wages? The simple fact is that nobody is forced to take jobs in 
those sectors if employment opportunities are better elsewhere. It is 
precisely because jobs in export firms are better than jobs elsewhere 
that export-led growth improves living conditions. 
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Lessons from Less Successful Experiences 
There are some obvious circumstances in which development will 
not succeed. Among them are pervasive corruption, excessive regu-
lation, and nonoperational bureaucracies. An illuminating if depress-
ing catalogue of these dysfunctional conditions is presented in 
Harberger (1984). I shall not try to recapitulate all his points here. 
Instead, I wish to emphasize a few "less obvious" barriers to 
economic development and growth. 
Failure of Exclusionary Policies. Among the deleterious trade 
and industrial policies which a country can institute are actions which 
diminish its access to badly needed complementary factors of pro-
duction. One of these is to eliminate essential economic groups in the 
name of other perceived goals. This took place, for instance, in many 
African countries when Asians and Europeans were expelled in 
pursuit of Africanization. Uganda under Idi Amin was both a human 
tragedy and an economic tragedy. That country is still suffering from 
the excesses of those years. 
Another policy with adverse economic effects is to push multina-
tional corporations so far that they find it more profitable to abandon 
existing operations rather than accede to the conditions host coun-
tries attempt to impose on them. This occurred in the mid-1970s in 
Jamaica when a leftist government attempted to impose a large 
bauxite levy. Rather than paying it, Reynolds Aluminum and the 
others closed their Jamaican operations and relocated elsewhere. 
This should have come as little surprise. While orthodox and radical 
economic theorists disagree in a great many respects, they fully agree 
that corporations are motivated by the pursuit of their own interests 
(orthodoxy calls this "profit maximization," radical analysis the 
"drive for capital accumulation"). Analysts of both persuasions 
would predict that if push comes to shove, multinationals will have 
no compunction about seeking greener pastures elsewhere. To think 
otherwise is to ignore the multinationals' very reason for being. 
The lessons here are basic. More often than not, what makes poor 
countries poor is the lack of productive inputs with which their 
people can work. To create an inhospitable environment may well 
force the country to do without the inputs it needs. Unfortunately, 
134 GARY FIELDS 
the poor are those who would be expected to be hurt the most by 
such policies, because it is the demand for their labor which is 
reduced first. 
Need for Labor-intensive Production. Another mistake is to 
presume that export-led growth will invariably have favorable equity 
effects (or, alternatively, to presume that it will not). Not all exports 
are the same. When export-led growth has succeeded in extending 
the benefits of growth widely, it has done so when the products 
exported make intensive use of that resource which the poor have the 
most of: their labor. Broadly speaking, two classes of exports fall into 
this category: manufactures and agricultural products. The successes 
of East Asia have entailed the employment of large numbers of 
workers in the production of manufactured goods. But it is also true 
that poverty is substantially lessened when large numbers of persons 
have been put to work in the tea industry of Sri Lanka, the banana 
industry of Costa Rica, or the fishing industry of Peru (and, one 
suspects, the drug industry of Colombia). When export-led growth 
has failed, it has often been in circumstances where the products 
exported make very little use of labor. This is most common when the 
export good is a mineral product. Oil, copper, and aluminum are 
examples. 
The lesson appears to be that export-led growth does not auto-
maticallyhave a sizeable effect on the poor. It does when exports are 
labor-intensive manufactures or agricultural products; it often does 
not when exports are mineral-based. When it comes to choosing 
trade and industrial policies for widespread development, planners 
and aid agencies should be careful not to draw the wrong conclusion. 
The conclusion is not that trade per se helps the poor. It is that the 
poor are helped by trade when it shifts the demand curve for their 
labor, and seldom otherwise. 
A last lesson from some of the less successful cases is the critical 
role of wage policy in influencing or even reversing a country's 
"natural" comparative advantage. Because of the importance of this 
topic, it is treated separately in the section which follows. 
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Labor Market Policy and Export-led Growth 
The wage policies in the newly industrializing countries of East Asia 
differ from those in most other developing countries. Of greatest 
importance is their reliance on market wage determination, which 
means that wages in those economies are determined primarily by 
supply and demand. 
Policies in Most Developing Economies. Often, in the devel-
oping world, wages are not determined by supply and demand, but 
rather by any or all of a number of nonmarket forces. These 
nonmarket forces often have potent influences in key sectors of those 
countries' labor markets. Minimum wage lawszit common in many 
developing countries, at least in certain major sectors (e.g., large 
factories). When these laws are enforced, wages may be very much 
higher in the affected sectors than they might otherwise have been 
in the absence of minimum wage laws. Labor unions often are very 
strong, and are able to use their strength at the bargaining table to 
secure above-market wages for their members. Pay policy with respect 
to public sector employees frequendy results in higher wages being paid 
to government workers than to comparable workers in the private 
sector. Multinational corporations sometimes are encouraged to pay 
high wages to local workers, lest those corporations be expelled from 
the country if they do not. Finally, labor codes and protective labor 
legislation may add substantially to the costs employers must pay 
when they hire workers. These institutional forces are found in 
varying degrees throughout Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, 
and South Asia. 
Policies in East Asia. By contrast, wages and other labor costs 
have not for the most part been inflated artificially in East Asia. 
Economic development in those economies has depended on low 
labor costs. Policymakers in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan realized that if they were to gain and then maintain trade 
positions in world markets, the basis for doing so would be low price, 
and they then pursued policies that had the effect of restraining wage 
growth to market levels.6 
"» 
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Generally, wages have not been permitted to rise above market-
clearing levels in East Asia. Minimum wages exist in some of the 
countries, but their levels are so low as to be meaningless. Trade 
unions bargain over wages, but only in Hong Kong does the 
bargaining take place free of government restraint. Public employees 
receive wages comparable to those in the private sector, but not 
higher. Multinational corporations also follow market forces. But 
although market wage determination has dominated in East Asia in 
the past, there are signs that conditions may be changing. In 1985, 
Taiwan introduced a new labor law which sought to push wages up 
above market levels. The Korean government is committed to 
introducing a minimum wage in 1988. 
Some exceptions to market wage-setting bear mention. In the 
case of Singapore, wages were repressed between 1972 and 1979 
through direct government involvement in the tripartite National 
Wages Council. However, labor shortages became so severe that this 
policy was later abandoned. In its place was put a "wage-correction 
policy" designed to raise real wages, encourage capital-labor substi-
tution and technological upgrading, reduce dependence on foreign 
labor, and ultimately achieve a "Second Industrial Revolution." But 
this so-called "high-wage policy" went too far. It ". . . contributed 
to declining international competitiveness, and thus to the decline in 
manufactured exports and employment and in economic growth 
generally by 1985, when the external economic environment weak-
ened, resulting in large-scale layoffs" (Lim, 1986, p. 11). A wage 
freeze was then imposed. As Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew put it: 
"Only after we have made up the ground lost in the years of negative 
growth in 1985 and, I fear, also in 1986 . . . can we afford to loosen 
our policy of wage restraint, and then we must peg future increases 
in wages to increases in productivity" (Asian Wall Street Journal, 
June 24,1986). Thus, government involvement in the wage-setting 
process has been an important feature of Singapore's labor market 
from time to time. 
The Korean government has also had a hand in repressing wages, 
though in more subtle fashion than in Singapore: 
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Acting through the Bankers' Association of Korea, the government 
also tried to keep wage increases low by having banks restrict credit 
for firms which increased wages beyond government guidelines. This 
move in late 1980, however, faced strong resistance from the 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions. Whenever there was a more 
explicit confrontation over this issue, the government would say 
'There is no official guideline. It is just a suggestion on the part of the 
government' (Nam, 1984, pp. 73-74). 
But considering the heavy involvement of government in the 
Korean economy and in the society, "suggestions" carry a great deal 
offeree (Bai, 1985). Scitovsky (1986, p. 154) attributes to Edward 
Mason the statement: "It does not take a Korean firm long to learn 
that it will 'get along' best by going along." Korean workers have 
recently taken to the streets by the tens of thousands to protest for 
strong labor rights. Wage repression is unlikely to be sustained in 
Korea for much longer. 
At the risk of overgeneralizing, I would say that the East Asian 
economies neither pushed wages well above market-clearing levels 
nor forced them well below market-clearing levels. In general, these 
economies' wage policies may be characterized as ones of market 
wage determination. 
Benefits of Market Wage Determination. Market wage deter-
mination, prevalent in much of East Asia thus far, has had several 
fundamentally important implications for the success of export-led 
growth in those economies. For one thing, it helped those countries 
avoid economic inefficiencies and misallocations of labor which 
might have arisen from distortions in wages; this in turn enabled 
them to avoid distortions in productivity between sectors. Market 
wage determination also naturally led employers to utilize the 
available labor force to the fullest extent possible, enabling those 
economies to pursue their inherent comparative advantages and 
produce goods intensive in labor. 
Market wage determination discourages substitution of capital 
for labor in the production process which, when it takes place, lessens 
employment. Market processes also diminish the expected-income 
incentive in rural-urban migration. As I have shown in Fields (1984), 
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the wage differential between manufacturing and agriculture is quite 
narrow in East Asia, much in contrast to most Latin American 
countries. Finally, market wage determination avoids unnecessarily 
high production costs that might hamper a country's ability to sell its 
products profitably in world markets. 
The wage policies adopted by East Asian nations quickly resulted 
in full employment, after which real wages rose rapidly (as shown by 
the figures in Table 1). The tight labor market, in turn, led to policies 
aimed at economizing on the use of increasingly scarce labor and 
enhancing labor productivity through investments in complemen-
tary physical and human capital. Thus, wage policy interacted with 
trade and industrialization strategies in these countries to contribute 
to successful, equitable development through export-led growth. 
There is an important lesson here. Whether an export-oriented 
trade strategy is better or worse than an inward-oriented strategy may 
well depend on a country's choice of wage policy. Suppose an export-
promoting country adopts a lenient wage policy which permits 
premature wage increases to be granted, and suppose further that 
because labor costs often constitute the largest share of total cost of 
a product, the country's exports become unprofitable in world 
markets. In such a case, if the revenues earned by private companies 
fail to equal the social costs of exporting, an export-oriented devel-
opment strategy subsidized by the government may cause the 
country to lose money. 
The interaction between trade policy and labor market policy has 
attracted considerable attention in the last year or two, both from 
policymakers and from researchers. The development agencies have 
called for increased labor market flexibility to accompany trade 
reforms (e.g., Rajapatirana, 1987). Policies of wage restraint and/or 
wage guidelines or wage-reform policies are part of many adjustment 
programs negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
1986, Table 12). However, it is not generally the policy of the World 
Bank to impose labor market reforms as conditions for structural 
adjustment loans or other external support. For further information, 
see Lim (1986), Koo, Haggard, and Deyo (1986), Krueger (1986), 
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Addison and Demery (1986), and Fields and Wan (1986) and the 
earlier references cited therein. 
Employment Adjustments. A final labor market issue, vital at 
the macroeconomic level though less important to trade policy per 
se, is that of wage and employment adjustment mechanisms. When 
wages are adjusted to prices and to other macroeconomic variables 
in an ad hoc way, wage levels are free to fulfill their standard 
equilibrating role. Likewise, when employers are free to take on and 
dismiss workers at will and workers are free to shift jobs, employment 
fulfills its standard equilibrating role. Labor markets adjust well in 
such circumstances. This is the case in the economies of East Asia, for 
example, in Korea, where wage tables and employment levels are 
adjusted annually based on prevailing supply and demand conditions 
in labor markets. In many other parts of the world, for example, in 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, wages are formally indexed to prices, 
and hiring and firing decisions are restricted, despite other stabiliza-
tion and liberalization policies. "Labor markets were changed little 
in the three countries. They continued to be controlled through 
penalties or prohibitions on labor dismissals, together with legislated 
wages and wage indexation. However, the weakening of trade union 
power in the early stages of the reforms amounted to some deregu-
lation" (Corbo and de Melo, 1987, p. 127). 
A position commanding a great deal of support in recent years is 
that wage indexation and employment rigidities have seriously 
impeded adjustment processes; but when "heterodox policies" 
combining fiscal correction and incomes policies were put into place 
in such countries as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Israel, 
inflation was brought under control and these economies were 
stabilized. Real wages fell sharply but, at least in some cases, 
temporarily.7 
Interrelationships between wage policy and macroeconomic sta-
bilization policy is another subject to which a great deal of attention 
is being directed.8 But, as this is more a matter of macroeconomics 
than trade, I shall give it no more attention here. 
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Prospects and Policies for Export-led Growth: The Case 
o f Costa Rica 
The key to successful export-led growth in Costa Rica is the private 
sector.9 This is partly because the private sector remains the primary 
employer, accounting for more than 80 percent of total employ-
ment, and partly because of the dynamism of local entrepreneurs and 
foreign investors. The most important task before the Costa Rican 
economic authorities is the upgrading of employment opportunities 
in the private sector as a means of achieving further economic devel-
opment. Specific policies that might help achieve this objective are 
macroeconomic stabilization policy, sectoral policy with respect to 
export expansion, and labor market policy. 
Macroeconomic Stabilization. A stable macroeconomic envi-
ronment is essential to employment generation. In a mixed capital-
istic system such as that of Costa Rica, the private sector must have 
confidence in the stability of the economic environment. Local 
entrepreneurs and foreign capitalists will invest in Costa Rica only if 
they are reasonably certain that they will receive at least a fair return 
on their money. They will believe just the opposite if external debts 
are not serviced, if real interest rates are negative, or if an overvalued 
currency is in imminent danger of devaluation—all of which were the 
case in Costa Rica in the economic crisis of the early 1980s. Under 
circumstances such as those, local investors will tend to place their 
money abroad and foreign investors will not enter Costa Rica at all. 
It is necessary that a stable macroeconomic environment be assured. 
At the urging of the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and with 
their financial backing, the Costa Rican government brought about 
the necessary stability. Among the policy measures taken in late 1982 
and early 1983 were 
• tightening of monetary policy to control inflation 
• reestablishment of positive real interest rates to stimulate 
investment 
• cuts in government spending and subsidies, to try to narrow 
the budget deficit 
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• increases in taxes, among them the social security tax, also to 
try to narrow the budget deficit 
• rescheduling of debt with ten creditor countries to permit 
payment to be made in a more manageable way 
• attainment of an understanding with commercial bank creditors, 
also to prevent payments from getting out of hand 
Macroeconomic stabilization policy has led to an economic 
recovery since 1983. Debt payments resumed, exports increased, 
inflation slowed, investment rose, and GNP grew. In fact, the World 
Bank's Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean has held 
forth the Costa Rican experience as a model for successful adjustment 
(Knox, 1985). The policy reforms, and the consequent resumption 
of economic growth, have had favorable labor market effects. Since 
1983, employment increased, unemployment and underemploy-
ment fell, real wages rose, and the composition of employment 
improved. The climate for future economic expansion is favorable. 
Macroeconomic policy can be the decisive factor in assuring eco-
nomic stability, and in the case of Costa Rica indeed it has been. 
Other countries in the region would do well to learn this lesson. 
Trade Policy. Costa Rica's economic growth has been export-
led. The two main categories of Costa Rica's exports are agricultural 
commodities and manufactured goods. The agricultural products 
include coffee, bananas, sugar, beef, and cocoa. These are sold in 
highly competitive world markets. The other category is manufac-
tured goods. Approximately 80 percent of exported manufactured 
goods and other "nontraditional exports" are sold within the pro-
tected Central American Common Market. 
Costa Rica has adopted a protectionist trade policy with respect 
to "nontraditional exports," a policy which is partly responsible for 
the change in the classification of that country's trade orientation 
from "moderately outward-oriented" in 1963-73 to "moderately 
inward-oriented" in the period 1973-85 (World Development Re-
port 1987, p. 53). One of the country's leading economists, Claudio 
Gonzalez-Vega (1984), has criticized these inward-oriented poli-
cies, calling instead for a more outward-looking trade strategy: 
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Costa Rica requires a series of sharp, rapid adjustments induced by 
bold economic policy revisions, including a much lower and uniform 
rate of protection of import substitution manufacturing, a reduction 
in the level of implicit or explicit subsidies, a much smaller public 
sector, particularly in productive areas, and a drastic overhauling of 
the financial sector, in order to increase the share of domestic savings 
in financing investment. 
Indeed, the Costa Rican economy now appears to be liberalizing. 
The licensing regulations and other controls established during the 
economic crisis of the early 1980s have since been dismantled. Costa 
Rica is now negotiating to join GATT. The economy is moving 
decidedly in the direction of more outward-looking trade policies. 
Conditions in Costa Rica are conducive to export expansion. The 
labor force is well educated and productive. Political stability makes 
Costa Rica attractive for foreign and local investors alike. Incentives 
for export are offered under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The 
government has undertaken major reforms as part of its structural 
adjustment program. 
These efforts have borne fruit. In recent years, assembly industries 
have been developed particularly successfully. These exports have 
been made overwhelmingly by foreign firms or by firms with 
substantial foreign investment. 
The equity effects of export expansion have been positive. More 
than 15,000 new jobs have been created, adding more than 10 
percent to Costa Rica's manufacturing employment (Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank, 1985). And there is no evidence that the size 
distribution of income has become any more dispersed with the 
expansion of international trade (Bourguignon, 1986, p. 51). 
Looking ahead, two key policy decisions must be made in Costa 
Rica: (1) whether to expand traditional exports (coffee, bananas, 
etc.) or nontraditionai exports (chiefly light manufactured prod-
ucts), and (2) how actively to promote exports through selective 
public expenditures, tax incentives to certain sectors, and the like 
("export promotion") versus a more laissez-faire approach ("export 
substitution"). 
On the first of these, most of the attention in Costa Rican policy 
circles is directed toward expanding nontraditionai exports. If Costa 
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Rica's comparative advantage in labor-intensive production is fol-
lowed, exports of nontraditional exports could create a great many 
jobs. In the highly competitive dynamic world economy of today, 
Costa Rica should be able to penetrate new markets. However, the 
expansion of nontraditional exports does not preclude the expansion 
of traditional exports. Yes, it is true that the world prices of coffee and 
bananas are volatile and that the terms of trade have been moving 
against these products. But it is also true that for geographical and 
climatic reasons, Costa Rica has a comparative advantage in land-
based products, the exports of which generate badly needed foreign 
exchange and rural employment. More attention should be given to 
the advantages of traditional exports as well as their disadvantages. 
Domestic circumstances and world market conditions do not obvi-
ously favor nontraditional exports in Costa Rica. 
The other strategic decision is how actively to promote exports, 
to which I suggest the following working rule may apply. The only 
export activities that should be promoted by the expenditure of 
public resources are infant industries with excellent prospects of 
paying their own way in the very near term but which, for some good 
reason (e.g., lack of transport facilities), are not now under way. The 
best products are those that can be sold in the world market, but 
consideration should also be given to those that can be exported to 
what is left of the Central American Common Market. Otherwise, a 
hands-off policy is in order, and incentives should be structured so 
that they are neutral with respect to production for export vs. 
production for the national/regional market. Costa Rica should not 
spend scarce public resources just to generate foreign exchange, just 
to diversify into new areas, or just to generate jobs in the export 
sector. Before such resources are expended, it must be shown that the 
benefits to society of that particular type of export promotion 
outweigh the costs. 
Labor Market Policy. Labor market policies in Costa Rica are on 
the whole quite reasonable. In general, a great deal of competition 
prevails within the private sector labor market in Costa Rica. Wages 
are set largely in accordance with supply and demand. Unions are 
present, but they cover only a small fraction of the private sector labor 
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force. Where unions are present, they do not raise wages much above 
the levels prevailing in the nonunionized sectors of their econo-
mies.10 Minimum wages also exist in Costa Rica. The authorities seek 
to keep the minimum wage growing in line with productivity but not 
faster (Gregory, 1981; Pollack, 1985). In a comprehensive study of 
minimum wages throughout the world, Starr (1981, p. 50) says of 
minimum wages in Costa Rica, " . . . the impact on wages actually 
paid, while significant, is far less extensive and apparent . . . " than in 
Colombia and Mexico. We may conclude that neither union wage-
setting nor minimum wages has an important influence on market 
wage levels in Costa Rica. 
The most important nonmarket force influencing wages in Costa 
Rica is public sector labor market policy.11 Wages in the public sector 
are about twice as high as those in the private sector. Large 
differentials remain even after standardizing for differences in the 
levels of education and experience of workers in the two sectors 
(Uthoff and Pollack, 1985; Gindling, 1987). 
Because of the higher pay in the public sector, private sector 
workers throughout Costa Rica aspire to public sector jobs. In 
response to the pressure for government jobs both from private 
sector workers and from the unemployed, the government has 
expanded public sector employment. This has led to shortages in the 
private sector in certain occupations, especially those requiring the 
highest amounts of education. 
The growth of public sector employment at above-market wage 
rates has diverted funds from other uses and is not obviously the best 
use of those resources. Serious thought should be given to two 
aspects of policy concerning public sector labor markets in Costa 
Rica: whether to freeze the amount of total employment in that 
sector, as was agreed upon but apparendy not effectuated; and 
whether to gradually bring public sector wage levels more into line 
with those in the private sector. 
All in all, market forces have a large role to play in determining 
wages in Costa Rica; other than in the public sector, employment and 
wage levels are determined largely in accordance with supply and 
demand and hence with labor productivity. The general adherence 
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to market wage determination in Costa Rica has favorable implica-
tions for that country's prospects for achieving economic develop-
ment through export-led growth. 
Looking Ahead 
In much of Latin America, Africa, and South Asia, the prevailing 
attitude toward outward-looking trade policies is one of distrust. 
Critics of outward-looking trade policies say trade makes them 
vulnerable to the rest of the world. I insist those countries are 
vulnerable anyhow, and their vulnerability is reduced if the goods 
produced are in high demand in the world market. (Witness, for 
instance, the resilience of the East Asian economies in the face of 
external shocks.) 
The critics say exports have only minimal effects on employment, 
citing such examples of capital-intensive export activities as copper 
mining in Chile and oil extraction and refining in Venezuela. I reply 
that nonmineral exports are very labor intensive, and point to 
industrial exports in the Far East and agricultural exports throughout 
Central America. 
The critics say that a drive to export means that wages must be 
kept low. Yet the mix of job opportunities in the newly industrializ-
ing economies of East Asia has improved substantially and wages in 
those countries have increased many-fold. 
The critics say that even if I were right about all these other points, 
things are different now, and that in today's stagnating world 
economy it is futile to try to export when world markets are not 
growing. But the "futility" argument assumes (almost always implic-
itly) that importers will maintain their traditional supply sources no 
matter what. This is an assumption I do not share. World markets are 
fickle, not loyal. 
In general, consumers and firms will buy elsewhere if it pays them 
to do so. It is the ability of the developing countries to supply goods 
of high quality at low prices, rather than an increase in global demand 
for these products, which results in rapid, equitable export-led 
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growth. This is why Japanese products have gained markets through-
out the world and why Korean products are competing so success-
fully today. 
Take the example of Hyundai automobiles, one of the latest 
Korean success stories. Hyundai is the number one import in Canada 
and is growing rapidly in the United States. Why? Hyundai saw these 
markets as potentially profitable. They believed, rightly, that despite 
difficult world economic conditions, the North American markets 
were open to them. They were confident that consumers would 
choose Hyundais over Toyotas or Chevrolets if Hyundai's autos 
were better in quality and/or price. 
Hyundai employs tens of thousands of workers who produce 
manufactured goods for export around the world. Similarly, entre-
preneurs in the Asian countries are continually seeking new markets 
to penetrate and new ways to cut costs while maintaining quality. As 
they succeed, more jobs are created, competition for labor is height-
ened, real wages are pulled up, and workers' standards of living are 
raised. This occurs not only in the export industries but also in other 
industries which either must pay the higher wages or lose their 
workers to better paying sectors. Thus, the benefits of growth are 
widespread. 
Another example of successful export diversification is the chang-
ing situation in the world market for baseballs and baseball equip-
ment. A large proportion of the baseballs used in the United States 
are manufactured in Haiti, the reason being that American sporting 
goods companies have found it profitable to set up operations there. 
This example is important, because it shows that Haiti has started to 
follow a development strategy similar to that of Korea, and that Haiti 
has successfully penetrated a significant market, as Korea has done on 
a much larger scale. The fact that balls for America's national game 
are manufactured abroad (as are most of the fielders' mitts, batters' 
helmets, and other baseball equipment) says a great deal about the 
possibilities of world trade. 
Let other countries consider similar possibilities for enhancing 
employment and achieving equitable growth by producing and 
selling in world markets. Every item you see might conceivably be 
produced in the developing world. If hundreds of Haitian workers 
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can be employed making baseballs, receiving higher wages than they 
could have earned elsewhere in that impoverished economy, why not 
expect a Latin American economy to produce and sell footballs to the 
U.S.? Or an African country to produce lightbulbs for Europe? Or an 
Asian country to produce luggage for Brazil? The possibilities are 
limitless: just look around and think whether it is possible to produce 
the item in question at a lower cost than it is now being made. In 
many cases, the answer will be no because the comparative advantage 
is to be found elsewhere: televisions will probably go on being made 
in Japan, aircraft in the United States, and wines in France. But 
sometimes the answer will be yes. I am sure there are ample oppor-
tunities for export diversification to lead to economic growth and 
improved standards of living throughout the developing world. 
If the drive to achieve economic development through export-led 
growth is to succeed, public policy must be appropriate. Export 
diversification will not happen unless a cost advantage exists and is 
maintained. Labor cost is a major cost of production, often the most 
important one. An important component of public policy is there-
fore wage policy. Third World countries must be patient and allow 
wages to be pulled up by supply and demand. Premature increases in 
labor costs must be avoided. Not to be able to export profitably is 
bad; to export unprofitably, failing to cover the costs of export 
promotion, is worse. 
Conclusions 
1. Policy reform and equity mean many things to many people. 
This paper considers the effects of trade and industrialization strate-
gies on poverty. 
2. These strategies must be chosen in light of four new realities of 
today's international scene: a secular worsening of the terms of trade, 
the inability of some and the diminished ability of others to accumu-
late additional debt to finance growth, the reduced likelihood of 
sustaining previous standards of living without further adjustments, 
and prospects of continued sluggishness in the international econ-
omy. 
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3. After discarding those nonpolicies which are little more than 
wishful thinking, and in recognition of the limited availability of 
external resources, the most practicable way of resuming economic 
growth for the benefit of the poor is through renewed attention to 
the prospective gains from exports. 
4. At the risk of overgeneralizing, it may be said that the 
economies of East Asia had certain features of export-led growth in 
common: they sought to earn profits by penetrating foreign markets; 
they had a warranted export optimism; they relied on products for 
which there was a preexisting demand; they allowed market prices to 
reflect comparative advantage; and they had flexible labor market 
policies. However, they differed in the degree to which they ex-
pended resources to actively promote exports. 
5. Export-led growth has had favorable equity effects in East Asia. 
Not only have GNP's grown, but also full employment has been 
attained, the composition of employment has steadily improved, real 
wages have increased several-fold, absolute poverty has fallen rapidly, 
and income inequality is at low-to-moderate levels. By shifting the 
demand for labor and improving job opportunities, export-led 
growth has benefited the poor in that part of the world. 
6. Some of the obvious impediments to widespread improve-
ments in living standards are pervasive corruption, excessive regula-
tion, and nonoperational bureaucracies. Other less obvious but 
important impediments are adherence to policies which deprive local 
workers of complementary inputs and reliance on mineral exports 
which use little labor. 
7. Labor market policies may make the difference between 
successful export-led growth and inability to compete in world 
markets. Premature wage increases are to be avoided. Also to be 
avoided is wage repression. 
8. Costa Rica is among those countries which offer the prospect 
of successful, broad-based export-led growth. Critical to their efforts 
are macroeconomic stabilization policy, trade policy, and labor 
market policy. 
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9. Looking ahead, other developing countries would do well to 
set aside their fears of involvement in the world economy by 
examining the records of those countries which have succeeded and 
studying what they did right. Producing for the world market 
remains a viable option for developing countries, not in all products, 
but in many. They have few options left. 
